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ABSTRACT 
We investigate the relationship between corporate board structure and firm performance of 
Bangladeshi companies. Using a sample of 654 firm- year observations for the period 2005-2009, the 
results show some support for aspects of agency theory as a greater proportion of independent directors 
on boards is related to better firm performance. Supporting resource dependence theory our result also 
suggest that larger boards provide valuable business experience, expertise, skill and social and 
professional networks which might add substantial business resources to the firms and thus positively 
impact on performance. We also find that female and foreign directors in Bangladesh provide more 
monitoring which leads to better firm performance. Our study contributes to extant research on board 
structure–performance relationship by providing evidence from an emerging economy context which is 
characterised by ownership concentration, family dominance and poor regulatory oversight.  
INTRODUCTION 
There has been an increasing interest in corporate governance in recent years due to collapses of 
major corporations in developed countries, such as Enron, WorldCom, HIH, One Tel. Such collapses 
of high profile corporate suggest the urgency of better corporate governance (Lavelle, 2002), although 
there are many debates concerning the efficiency of corporate governance (Clarke et al., 1998). The 
significance of strong corporate governance is evidenced by various governance reforms that have 
been undertaken around the world (see for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, CLERP 9 in 
Australia, Combined Code in the UK, and the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) 
Code). The collapse of Satyam in India suggests that good governance in the corporate sector is an 
important issue for the developing countries as well. Accordingly, international financial agencies 
such as World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) have emphasised upon corporate governance 
reform as part of development goal for the developing countries. 
The objective of our study is to advance the international corporate governance research agenda by 
describing the corporate governance environment in an emerging economy like Bangladesh and to 
examine the board structure and firm performance relationship using data from listed non-financial 
companies in Bangladesh during the period 2005-2009.The socialist ideology adopted by the 
Bangladesh government after it became a sovereign state in 1971 led to the nationalisation of its limited 
private sector owned industries. However, subsequent governments facing significant pressures for 
better economic transparency and accountability from donor agencies such as the World Bank, switched 
to privatisation policies, which resulted in the transfer of many government controlled entities to family 
ownership (World Bank, 2009). Consequently, Bangladesh’s capital market has evolved to comprise a 
high proportion of family owned public-listed companies. Siddiqui (2010) in his recent review of 
corporate governance within the Bangladesh corporate sector is critical of the high ownership 
concentration, family dominance, lack of shareholder activism, and poor enforcement and monitoring of 
regulations.  
A prime motivation for investigating corporate governance, particularly corporate board structure 
in Bangladesh is that there has been a recent drive recently to attract more foreign direct investment in 
its fast growing private sector as a means of promoting economic development. As such the focus on 
foreign investment in Bangladesh has necessitated more transparent corporate operations. Additionally, 
in the context of Bangladesh, it is so warrant that the World Bank has imposed conditions requiring the 
improvement of corporate governance practices in order to get financial assistance (Solaiman, 2006). 
Accordingly in more recent times there have been some efforts to improve corporate governance 
practices in Bangladesh. As a part of World Bank reform programme the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in Bangladesh had issued a ‘Corporate Governance Notification’ in 2006 which 
consists of some guidelines in regards to corporate governance practices including board structure of the 
listed companies on ‘Comply or Explain basis’. This notification requires that board size of a company 
should be limited between 5 to 20 members. It also requires that one tenth of the board members should 
be independent members. Furthermore it requires the companies that the office of the Chairperson of the 
Board and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) should preferably be filled by two different individuals. In 
general board is not required to have any committee other than audit committee. It is argued that 
effective corporate governance leads to high level financial performance as well as market valuation 
(Klapper and Love, 2004; Rajagopalan and Zhang, 2008). An examination of different aspects of board 
structure which is an important governance mechanism provides us insight to the improvements in 
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corporate governance in an emerging economy like Bangladesh. We therefore examine different aspects 
of Bangladeshi corporate board structure and firm performance. 
Corporate board structure as a critical internal governance mechanism has received significant 
attention in the previous studies (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Yermack, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009). The findings of these studies suggest that the board of directors through its 
monitoring activities minimises agency costs associated with the principal-agent relationship between 
owners and managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Lower agency costs in turn have implications for better 
firm performance. For instance, prior studies (Yermack, 1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and 
Hudaib, 2006) suggest that board characteristics such as independence, size and CEO duality are 
directly related to firm performance. A limited number of studies have also been done in developing 
economy settings since emerging markets differ substantially (Powse, 1999) from developed economies 
in their institutional, regulatory and legal environments.1 However, the evidence relating to the impacts 
of Bangladeshi board independence, size and CEO duality on performance is scant. 
Recently a study by Carter et al. (2003) using a sample of Fortune 1000 firms find that gender 
diversity improves board monitoring resulting in better performance. Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) find 
that foreign board members signal a higher commitment to corporate monitoring and transparency 
which leads to an increase in firm performance. Whilst female directors and foreign directors have been 
found to be related to board effectiveness (Carter et al., 2003; Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003), their 
impact on firm performance in a developing country like Bangladesh is unclear. The participation of 
Bangladeshi females on boards has been a more recent phenomenon. Female workers are still heavily 
concentrated in rural areas (employed in low productivity daily work for poor wages and often 
concentrated in public food for work programs) and in unpaid family businesses (Ahmed and Maitra, 
2010). The literacy rates are approximately 48 per cent for female, compared to 59 per cent for men in 
2009 (UNESCO, 2009). Further, foreign directors are also another aspect that may improve board 
effectiveness. Foreign directors are becoming increasingly common in Bangladesh because of the 
growth in multinational ventures. Haque et al. (2006), report that almost 14 per cent of the listed non-
financial Bangladeshi firms have foreign directors. As such, whether females and foreign directors on 
Bangladeshi boards have a significant impact on performance remains an empirical issue. Our study 
addresses this issue by investigating the impact of female and foreign directors along with other board 
characteristics such as board size, independence and CEO duality on firm performance.  
We find, based on recent data from Bangladeshi public-listed firms, that board independence has 
a positive and significant impact on firm performance. This implies that board monitoring by 
independent directors improves firm performance which is supported by agency argument. Consistent 
with the resource dependence theory our result also suggest that larger boards provide valuable 
business experience, expertise, skill and social and professional network which might add substantial 
business resources to the firms and thus positively impact on performance. Furthermore, we document 
that female and foreign directors are positively related to performance.  
The findings of this study contribute to the literature in a number of ways. We examine the 
impact of board structure on firm performance in an emerging market setting such as Bangladesh, 
where there is a limited research on corporate governance practices. Corporate board as a critical 
governance mechanism is important for Bangladeshi publicly listed companies due to recent 
recommendations by the SEC that outlines some requirements for board structure. We take into 
account of some important board structure variables in Bangladeshi market which is characterised by 
ownership concentration, family dominance, lack of shareholder activism, poor regulatory oversight. 
While examining the impact of board structure on performance we consider two topical aspects of 
corporate board, namely female and foreign director which have received, significantly little attention 
in the emerging economy context. Overall, the outcome of the study may have some implications for 
the policy makers and regulators in understanding the impact of board structure on the quality of 
corporate governance practices in Bangladeshi firms. It can help the regulators to adopt an appropriate 
balance of legislation, regulatory reform and their enforcement to make improvements in the corporate 
governance practices in Bangladeshi firms. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section provides reviews related literature 
and develops hypotheses. This is followed by a section that describes research methodology. The 
empirical results are then presented which is followed by further analysis. The last section then 
summaries and concludes the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 Board Independence and Performance 
                                                            
1 See for example, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Elsayed (2007), Jackling and Johl (2009). 
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Agency theory suggests that a higher proportion of independent directors2 should lead to better 
firm performance since it reduces the conflict of interests between the shareholders and managers 
and makes management more effective through better monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). Empirical evidence based on previous studies indicates mixed findings with 
respect to the relationship between board independence and firm performance. For example, 
Weisbach (1988) notes that board independence is positively related to performance. He argues that 
the independent directors perform monitoring role in the firms which in turn improves firm 
performance. Similarly, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment of a further outside 
director would lead to an increase in shareholder wealth. Moreover boards with more independent 
directors are more likely to force resignation of poorly performing CEOs. The findings of the study 
by Baysinger and Butler (1985) also support this contention.  
Although it is argued that board independence improves firm performance through monitoring, 
prior research document a negative impact of board independence on firm performance. For 
example, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) document a negative relationship between board 
independence and firm performance. They argue that independent directors are sometimes added to 
boards for political reasons and these directors have lack of monitoring expertise which in turn 
affects firm performance negatively. Erickson et al. (2005) find that that poorly performing firms 
increase the fraction of outside directors in subsequent periods to please unhappy investors. 
However, this addition of directors also has a negative impact on performance.  
There is also a group of studies which find that board independence does not have any effect 
on firm performance. For example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find no relationship between the 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board and performance. In the same vein, Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no evidence that greater board independence improves firm performance.  
Although prior research on the issue of whether independent directors add value to a firm’s 
performance is mixed, the agency theory approach is adopted for the examination of board 
independence in this study. The SEC notification on corporate governance in Bangladesh requires 
the listed firms to have independent directors (at least one tenth of the total number of the 
company’s board of directors). Such a guideline has emphasised upon the need for independent 
directors capable of acting independently. Family dominance and poor regulatory oversight in 
Bangladesh implies the need of independent directors to protect the interest of minority shareholders. 
The agency theory suggests that higher portion of independent directors will increase the monitoring 
and reduce any self-interested actions by managers and therefore, will be related to better firm 
performance. The first hypothesis is based on agency theory and is proposed accordingly. 
 H1: The proportion of independent directors on the board of directors of Bangladeshi firms is 
positively related to firm performance.  
 Board Size and Performance 
Board size is a significant determinant of effective corporate governance mechanism (Pearce II 
and Zahra, 1992; Dalton et al. 1999). While inclusion of more directors increases the board 
monitoring capacity, the incremental cost of poor communication and decision making associated 
with larger groups may outweigh the benefits. Accordingly, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that 
larger board may face poor coordination due to the large number of potential interactions among 
group members and free riding problem. They recommend limiting the board members maximum to 
ten people, with a preferred size of eight to nine.  
Previous empirical evidence suggests that board size may potentially affect the quality of 
corporate governance and firm performance. For example, Yermack (1996) finds evidence that 
firms with smaller boards usually have higher market valuations than firms with larger boards. He 
also finds that firms have positive abnormal stock returns around the announcement dates of 
reduction in their board size. Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (1998) document an inverse relationship 
between board size and performance in Finnish firms. In contrast, there is a group of studies that 
suggests a positive relationship between board size and performance which is supported by resource 
dependence theory (Dalton et al., 1998; Yammeesri and Herath, 2010; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; 
Jackling and Johl, 2009). Consistent with the resource dependence theory, these studies argue that 
larger boards offer more experience and knowledge, which in turn increase managerial ability to 
make better business decisions and improve firm performance.  
 The corporate governance notification in Bangladesh has emphasised upon board size. It is 
however, unclear to what extent the research findings from Western world with respect to board size 
and performance will be applicable for Bangladeshi companies. There is clearly inadequate number 
of qualified independent directors which suggests that firms may have to rely upon larger boards for 
getting access to external environment to reduce uncertainty and improve performance. Furthermore, 
                                                            
2 An independent director in Bangladesh means a director who does not hold any share in the company or who holds lees 
than 1 percent of total paid up shares of the company; who is not connected with the company or its promoters or 
directors on the basis of family relationship; who does not have any other relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, 
with the company or its subsidiary/ associated companies; who is not a member, director or officer of any stock exchange; 
and who is not a shareholder, director or officer of any member of stock exchange or an intermediary of the capital 
market (SEC notification, 2006). 
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most of the family dominated firms may appoint family members on boards, which is likely to 
restrict the recruitment of qualified independent directors on Bangladeshi corporate boards. Given 
these characteristics, larger Bangladeshi boards may provide substantial business resources to the 
firms. Consistent with the resource dependence theory, we hypothesise that larger boards will lead to better 
firm performance. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is presented as follows. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the size of the board and performance of Bangladeshi 
firms. 
 CEO Duality and Performance 
According to agency theory same person should not hold two positions concurrently, as this 
will lessen the effectiveness of board monitoring and create a conflict between management and 
board which may lead to poor performance (Finkelstien and D’ Aveni, 1994). Kang and Zardkoohi 
(2005) argue that CEO duality reduces firm performance due to CEO entrenchment and a decline in 
board independence. In addition, CEO duality provides a CEO the power to negotiate with the board 
which may help the CEO to pursue self-serving interest. Previous studies find a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Brickley et al., 1997; Goyal and Park, 
2002; Yermack, 1996) which is consistent with the agency argument.  
In contrast to agency theory resource dependency theory argues that CEO duality can increase 
CEO discretion by providing a broader power base and control authority, and can weaken the relative 
power of other interest groups (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) note 
that CEO duality responses faster to external events, and facilitate accountability of decision making 
which in turns improve firm performance. Moreover, Boyd (1995) argues that CEO duality is more 
advantageous under certain external environmental condition, such as resource scarcity and complex 
and dynamic environment. Previous empirical research documents a positive impact of CEO duality 
on firm performance which is consistent with the resource dependence argument (Pearce and Zahra, 
1991, Daily and Delton, 1992; Boyd, 1995). 
The SEC notification on corporate governance recommends the role of chairman and CEO 
should be separated, to limit the power of board leaders particularly given the importance of family 
dominated companies in Bangladesh. This is consistent with the non-duality argument implying that 
the separation of CEO and chairman positions ensures better corporate monitoring which in turn 
improves performance. Braun and Sharma (2007) find that risk of family entrenchment reduces 
when different persons occupy the CEO and board chair position. Therefore, in the light of 
corporate governance notification in Bangladesh, we take into account of agency perspective of 
CEO duality which suggests an adverse effect on performance. Accordingly, we propose the 
following hypothesis. 
H3: There is a negative relationship between CEO duality and performance of Bangladeshi firms. 
 Female Directors and Firm Performance 
It is argued that diversity of corporate board enhances better monitoring and it increases board 
independence (Mace, 1971). Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that female board members 
improve board inputs – have higher board attendance, improve board attendance of male directors, 
and are more likely to take up monitoring positions on audit. Moreover, they are more likely to hold 
CEOs accountable for poor performance. Letender (2004) argues that female directors sometimes 
incite lively boardroom discussions, which leads to better decision making. Kramer et al. (2006) find 
that female directors are more prepared than male directors to push “tough issues” at the board that 
other were reluctant to tackle. 
There have been several empirical studies that document a significantly positive relationship 
between gender diversity and firm performance (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2003; Francoeur, et 
al., 2008). The findings of these studies suggest that the presence of female directors on the board is 
rewarded with a market value premium since they play a vital role in effective monitoring and 
maintaining the efficiency of a board of directors.  
Previous studies, on the other hand, document a negative relationship between the proportion of 
female directors and performance (Bohren and Stron, 2010; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). The findings 
of these studies suggest that female board members may be appointed on the board as a sign of 
tokenism, and as such their contributions may be marginalized. Furthermore, Rose (2007) argues that 
female board members with a non-traditional background who are in the socialization process 
instinctively adopt the ideas of the majority of conventional board members. This results in non-
materialization of potential performance.  
The corporate governance notification in Bangladesh did not provide any guideline with respect 
to gender diversity of corporate boards. In some Bangladeshi family dominated firms female board 
members are usually appointed based on family ties. In most cases, the founder owners or directors 
appoint their wives and daughters on the boards, often with the motive of increasing family voting 
power or dominance (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). As family members, they do not need to bring in-
depth business perspective, skill or educational qualifications (Uddin and Choudhury, 2008). The 
cultural perspective is also very important to understand the impact of female board members on firm 
performance. The participation of females on the labour force has increased from 23.9 percent in 1999 
   Academy of Taiwan Business Management Review        101 
to 31.5 percent in 2009 (BBS, 2009). The literacy rate for woman is also increasing.3 Furthermore the 
national women development policy emphasises upon women empowerment. This is evidenced by 
increasing number of female participation in the national parliament and in Bangladesh civil service. 
Although gender inequality still prevails in Bangladesh, it is expected that female board members will 
prove their competencies by efficient monitoring and improving firm performance. 
Based on the above discussion we propose following hypothesis.  
H4:There is a significant positive impact of proportion of female directors on performance of 
Bangladeshi firms. 
 Foreign Directors and Firm Performance 
It is argued that foreign directors bring valuable knowledge related to contextual issues in foreign 
markets and are able to increase the quality of strategic decision making (Zahra and Filatotchev, 2004). 
Moreover, foreign directors are less likely to be affiliated with the firms and its management and 
hence they are more likely to be independent (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Therefore, from an 
agency theory perspective foreign directors may improve monitoring resulting in better firm 
performance. The limited empirical evidence on the relationship between foreign directorship and 
firm performance also supports this contention. For example, Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) find that 
foreign board members have significantly positive impact on firm performance. They argue that 
having a foreign member on the board signals a higher commitment to corporate monitoring and 
transparency and enhance reputation in the financial market which leads to an increase in firm value.  
The corporate governance notification in Bangladesh did not provide any guideline with respect 
to foreign directors on corporate boards. The inclusion of foreign board members in Bangladeshi firms 
is a step forward to the globalization process. The inclusion of foreign board members will promote 
exchange of information to their international network. They can bring valuable knowledge and 
expertise in Bangladeshi firms. Their presence will also signal a commitment to shareholder rights, 
something which appeals to investors. In brief consistent with the agency argument we conjecture that 
foreign directors in Bangladesh can improve the accountability process in the light of their foreign 
experience and knowledge. Thus it can be argued that foreign directors can make the board more 
effective and efficient resulting in a better performance. Accordingly, we propose the following 
hypothesis. 
H5:There is positive relationship between proportion of foreign directors on the board and 
performance of Bangladeshi firms. 
DATA AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 Data and Sample Selection 
The sample consists of all 155 non-financial companies listed with Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) 
in Bangladesh from 2005 to 2009, producing a total sample of 775 sample year observation.4 Due to 
missing information, we then had to exclude 121 firm year observations, yielding a final sample of 
654 firm-years observations. The data for our analysis comes from multiple sources of secondary data. 
We collect the financial data from the annual reports of the sample companies listed on the stock 
exchange. Stock price data is obtained from the DataStream database. Corporate governance data was 
hand collected from the corporate governance disclosures and directors’ report contained in annual 
reports. 
 Model Specification 
The following model is used to test Hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5. 
PERFORMANCE = α + β1 BIND + β2 BSIZE + β3CEODU + β4 FEMDIR + β5 FORDIR + β6 
BOWN+ β7 FSIZE + β8 FAGE + β9 LEV + β10 RISK + β11 GROWTH + β12 
INDDUM + β13 YEARDUM + ε 
One concern in the above model, if an OLS regression analysis is used, is the potential 
endogenity problem as pointed out by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988). This is consistent, for example, 
that better-performing firms having superior board structure platform or poor performance by firms 
resulting in initiatives aimed at improving board structure and the accountability of managers and 
directors. To address endogeneity problems we use a two-stage least squared regression analysis and 
instrumental variables. To test for endogeneity in the model, the method of generalised instrumental 
variable estimation is used. Firstly, each of the potentially endogenous variables is individually 
regressed on a set of available instruments and the truly exogenous variables in the model. These 
represent a series of single reduced form or artificial equations, where the instruments are second 
lagged values of the potentially endogenous variables5.  
                                                            
3 It is 48.6 percent in 2009 (BBS, 2009). 
4 In 2005, there were 282 listed companies in the DSE. Out of this, 127 companies belong to the financial sector. These 
have been excluded since they are controlled by different regulations and likely to have different disclosure 
requirements and governance structure. 
5 Consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) we use lagged values of board structure variables. 
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Table 1: Summary of the operationalisation 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent variable  
Tobin’s Q  
 
The market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by book value of total 
assets 
Return on Assets (ROA) The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes and book value of total assets. 
Explanatory variables   
Board independence (BIND) The proportion of independent directors on the board, who do not have any material 
interest into the firm 
Board size (BSIZE) The number of directors on the board 
CEO duality (CEODU) Where the same person serves the role of the CEO of the firm as well as the Chairman of 
the board 
Female directors (FEMDIR) The proportion of female directors on the board 
Foreign directors (FORDIR) The proportion of foreign directors on the board 
Control variables   
Board ownership (BOWN) The percentage of directors’ total shareholdings 
Firm size (FSIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets 
Firm age (FAGE) Natural log of the number of year since the firm’s inception 
  
Risk (RISK) The standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period 
Leverage (LEV) The ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets 
Growth (GROWTH) Firm’s assets growth ratio 
Finally we use year dummies (YEARDUM) and industry dummies (INDDUM) for manufacturing 
and processing, services, information technology (IT) and other sectors. 
REGRESSION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents three panels of descriptive statistics for the full sample. It provides means, 
medians and standard deviations for the main variables in the full sample. The average number of 
director is around 7, 6.30 per cent are independent directors (BIND), 16.90 per cent are female 
directors (FEMDIR) and 5.50 per cent are foreign directors (FORDIR). Moreover, on average 25 per 
cent firms have CEO duality (CEODU). The average Tobin’s Q and ROA of our sample firms are 
1.508 and 0.073 respectively. The average firm age (FAGE) is nearly 23 years and the average firm 
size (FSIZE) is 8.70 (natural logarithm of total assets). 
Table 2 provide summary statistics for the data of our analysis. The data is consisting of 654 
firm’s year observations from 2005 to 2009 listed at Dhaka Stock Exchange. Tobin’s Q is the 
market value of equity plus the book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. ROA 
is the ratio of profit after tax and book value of total assets, Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the 
number of directors on the board. Board independence (BIND) calculated as the number of 
independent directors scaled by the size of the board.CEO duality (CEODU) is a dummy variable 
equal to one when the chairperson is the CEO and zero otherwise. Female (FEMDIR) and foreign 
directors (FORDIR) are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board 
respectively. Board ownership (BOWN) is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings on the 
board. Firm age (FAGE) is the natural log of number of years since firm inception. Leverage (LEV) 
is calculated as the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk (RISK) is the 
standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size (FSIZE) 
is the natural log of book value of assets. Growth (GROWTH) of a firm is measured by taking the 
firm’s assets growth ratio.  
TABLE 2:Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Observations 
SIZE 8.696 8.684 0.659 654 
Tobin’s Q 1.508 1.118 1.200 654 
LEV 0.749 0.604 0.789 654 
FAGE 22.989 23.000 10.940 654 
ROA 0.073 0.070 0.095 654 
BSIZE 6.742 6.500 2.073 654 
BOWN 0.293 0.304 0.201 654 
GROWTH 0.116 0.048 0.341 654 
RISK 0.028 0.027 0.024 654 
CEODU 0.246 0.000 0.431 654 
BIND 0.063 0.000 0.082 654 
FEMDIR 0.169 0.143 0.183 654 
FORDIR 0.055 0.000 0.157 654 
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Table 3 provides a simple correlation matrix for the key variables in the analysis. Board 
independence (BIND) is positively correlated with board size (BSIZE) and ROA. However, board 
independence (BIND) is negatively correlated with CEO duality (CEODU). Board size (BSIZE) and 
foreign directors (FORDIR) are positively and significantly correlated with ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Further, companies with a higher level of female directors (FEMDIR) have a higher ROA. 
The following table provides correlation matrix. Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus 
the book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. ROA is the ratio of profit after tax 
and book value of total assets, Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the number of directors on the 
board. Board independence (BIND) calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by the 
size of the board.CEO duality (CEODU) is a dummy variable equal to one when the chairperson is 
the CEO and zero otherwise. Female (FEMDIR) and foreign directors (FORDIR) are measured by 
the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board respectively. Board ownership (BOWN) 
is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings on the board. Firm age (FAGE) is the natural log 
of number of years since firm inception. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as the ratio of book value of 
total debt to book value of total assets. Risk (RISK) is the standard deviation of the firm’s daily 
stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size (FSIZE) is the natural log of book value of 
assets. Growth (GROWTH) of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s assets growth ratio. Bold text 
indicates significant coefficient  
TABLE 3:Correlation matrix 
 BIND BZISE CEODU FEMDIR FORDIR FAGE FSIZE GROWTH LEV RISK Tobin's Q ROA BOWN 
BIND 1             
BZISE 0.0960 1.0000            
CEODU -0.1477 -0.1583 1.0000           
FEMDIR -0.0474 -0.1669 0.6520 1.0000          
FORDIR 0.1896 0.1520 0.0155 -0.1429 1.0000         
FAGE 0.0638 -0.0247 0.0214 -0.0284 -0.1066 1.0000        
FSIZE 0.0997 0.3023 -0.0232 -0.1955 0.2653 -0.0182 1.0000       
GROWTH 0.0343 0.0298 0.0937 0.0181 0.1316 -0.0715 0.1886 1.0000      
LEV -0.1223 -0.0646 0.0504 -0.0816 -0.0862 0.2575 -0.1789 -0.0520 1.0000     
RISK 0.0671 0.0065 -0.0821 -0.0736 -0.0455 -0.0144 0.0130 0.0249 0.0219 1.0000    
Tobin's Q 0.0542 0.0904 -0.0489 -0.0943 0.1456 0.1487 -0.0799 -0.0074 0.5774 0.0378 1.0000   
ROA 0.1884 0.1707 -0.0241 0.0798 0.1883 0.0481 0.1542 0.0976 -0.4057 -0.1340 -0.0008 1.0000  
BOWN -0.1772 -0.0832 0.1631 -0.3113 -0.116 -0.1501 -0.3291 -0.0032 -0.0334 -0.0775 -0.1246 -0.0052 1.0000 
 Regression results  
The main focus of our analysis is to examine the impact board structure on performance in 
Bangladeshi listed firms. The results are reported in Table 4. First we run an OLS regression. As 
previously discussed, we also use an instrumental variable (IV) regression to address the issue of 
endogeneity. It can also be argued that board structure variables may be endogenously determined 
by the unobserved firm heterogeneity. Therefore, we test our model using a fixed effect (FE) 
regression as well.  
z Board Independence 
The first hypothesis of interest is board independence (BIND). The findings are shown in 
Panels A and B of Table 4. We find that board independence (BIND) variable is positive and 
significant in both OLS (β = 0.392, p < 0.10) and fixed effect regressions (β = 1.421, p < 0.01) 
when Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of performance in Panel A. When we use ROA as the 
measure of performance in Panel B we find positive and significant coefficients of board 
independence (BIND) in all regressions (OLS: β = 0.106, p<0.01; IV: β = 0.207, p<0.01; FE: β = 
0.027, p<0.10). Thus H1 is supported. Consistent with the agency argument we document that 
board independence in Bangladesh improves firm performance by ensuring better monitoring. 
This is also consistent with the findings of previous studies from the developed countries 
(Weisbach ,1988 ; Baysinger and Butler 1985; and O’Connell and Cramer, 2010).  
z Board Size 
The variable tested in hypothesis two is board size (BSIZE). The coefficient of board size 
(BSIZE) is positive and significant in all three regressions (OLS: β = 0.047, p < 0.05; IV: β = 
0.057, p < 0.10; FE: β = 0.049, p < 0.10) when Tobin’s Q is used as the measure of performance 
in Panel A. When we use ROA to measure performance in Panel B we document results 
consistent with that of Panel A. Overall our results support H2. Consistent with the resource 
dependency argument our results suggest that board size has a positive impact on the performance 
of Bangladeshi firms. The findings of our analysis support previous studies such as Dalton et al. 
(1998) and Jackling and Johl (2009) which reveals that larger boards provide valuable business 
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knowledge, expertise, skill and social and professional network to the firms. Therefore, decision 
making process as well firm performance is improved.  
z CEO duality 
Our third hypothesis tests the impact of CEO Duality (CEODU) on firm performance. The 
coefficients of CEO duality are insignificant in all three regressions. It implies that CEO duality 
does not affect firm performance of our sample companies. Thus H3 is not supported. Our results 
are consistent with prior studies which suggest that the impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance varies with industry type and it will benefit some firms while separation will be more 
worthy for others (Baliga et al., 1996; Elsayed, 2007). 
z Female directors 
Our next hypothesis tests the relationship between the female directors and firm performance. 
The coefficient of female directors (FEMDIR) is positive and significant (OLS: β = 0.075, p<0.10; 
IV: β = 0.202, p<0.05) in OLS and IV regressions when performance is measured by Tobin’s Q in 
Panel A. When we use ROA as the measure of performance in Panel B we find positive and 
significant coefficient of female directors (FEMDIR) in all regressions (OLS: β = 0.060, p<0.05; 
IV: β = 0.063, p<0.05; FE: β = 0.029, p<0.05). Thus H4 is supported. In other words we document 
a positive impact of female directors on Bangladeshi firm performance which is consistent with 
the agency argument. Our overall findings may imply that in spite of some cultural impediments 
female board members perform monitoring effectively to improve firm performance. 
z Foreign directors 
Our last hypothesis examines the relationship between the foreign directors and performance. 
We find that the coefficient of foreign directors (FORDIR) is positive and significant in all three 
regressions when performance is measured by both Tobin’s Q (OLS: β = 1.607, p<0.01; IV: β = 
1.927, p<0.01; FE: β = 0.701, p<0.01) and ROA (OLS: β = 0.065, p<0.01; IV: β = 0.054, p<0.05; 
FE: β = 0.042, p<0.05). Consistent with Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) we also document that 
foreign directors improve performance of Bangladeshi firms. Thus H5 is supported. Our results 
imply that with their international exposure and commitment to minority shareholders as effective 
monitors foreign directors contribute to better firm performance.  
z Control Variables 
With respect to the control variables, we find that firm age (FAGE) is positive significantly 
and related to firm performance measured by both Tobin’s Q and ROA. The coefficient of risk 
(RISK) is negative and significant in both measure of performance. However, the coefficient for 
leverage6 (LEV) is positive and significant for Tobin’s Q and negative and significant for ROA. 
TABLE 4: Regression results: Board structure and firms performance 
 Panel A (Tobin’s Q) Panel B (ROA) 
 OLS IV FE OLS IV FE 
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. CoefficientProb.
C 2.207 0.000 2.105 0.000 2.601 0.072 -0.031 0.472 -0.041 0.308 0.037 0.815
BIND 0.392 0.073 0.401 0.522 1.421 0.014 0.106 0.007 0.207 0.000 0.027 0.051
BSIZE 0.047 0.018 0.057 0.069 0.049 0.057 0.009 0.047 0.001 0.035 0.006 0.062
CEODU -0.059 0.568 -0.189 0.216 0.139 0.169 0.003 0.702 -0.001 0.879 0.010 0.304
FEMDIR 0.075 0.049 0.202 0.036 0.401 0.103 0.060 0.029 0.063 0.052 0.029 0.041
FORDIR 1.607 0.000 1.927 0.000 0.701 0.009 0.065 0.000 0.054 0.036 0.042 0.037
BOWN -0.207 0.173 -0.281 0.215 -0.179 0.276 -0.108 0.032 -0.198 0.201 -0.142 0.173
GROWTH -0.059 0.443 -0.091 0.471 -0.207 0.029 0.017 0.382 0.027 0.159 0.006 0.043
LEV 0.827 0.000 0.901 0.000 0.717 0.001 -0.041 0.000 -0.039 0.000 -0.039 0.000
RISK -2.473 0.061 -2.142 0.141 -0.105 0.087 -0.502 0.000 -0.307 0.019 -0.108 0.127
FAGE 0.009 0.069 0.007 0.075 0.005 0.497 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.104
FSIZE -0.112 0.053 -0.128 0.074 -0.107 0.147 0.006 0.148 0.008 0.208 0.004 0.407
YEARDUM Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
INDDUM Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.542  0.531  0.691  0.317  0.282  0.684  
F-statistic 37.891  33.817  41.373  17.637  12.072  11.009  
The following Panel A and B reports the regression results relating board structure and firm 
performance. Family firms are those where the family members hold’s at least twenty percent 
                                                            
6 Since leverage and Tobin’s Q are highly correlated, we rerun our model after excluding leverage. We find results 
consistent with the results reported in Table 4. 
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equity ownership and at least one member of controlling family hold a managerial position 
otherwise firms are considered as non-family firms. Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus 
the book value of total debt divided by book value of total assets. ROA is the ratio of profit after 
tax and book value of total assets, Board size (BSIZE) is defined as the number of directors on the 
board. Board independence (BIND) calculated as the number of independent directors scaled by 
the size of the board.CEO duality (CEODU) is a dummy variable equal to one when the 
chairperson is the CEO and zero otherwise. Female (FEMDIR) and foreign directors (FORDIR) 
are measured by the proportion of female and foreign directors on the board respectively. Board 
ownership (BOWN) is the percentage of directors’ total shareholdings on the board. Firm age 
(FAGE) is the natural log of number of years since firm inception. Leverage (LEV) is calculated as 
the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Risk (RISK) is the standard 
deviation of the firm’s daily stock return over the prior 12-month period. Firm size (FSIZE) is the 
natural log of book value of assets. Growth (GROWTH) of a firm is measured by taking the firm’s 
assets growth ratio. Number of observation is 654. The reported results are heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate governance in Bangladesh plays an important role in attracting and holding the foreign 
investments, and in restoring confidence among both domestic and foreign investors. Corporate board 
as a critical internal governance mechanism can play a significant role in ensuring better corporate 
governance practices. Accordingly, we investigate the relationship between board structure and 
performance using a sample of the listed non-financial Bangladeshi companies. We find that board 
independence has a positive impact on performance of Bangladeshi firms. This is consistent with the 
monitoring perspective of agency argument documented in developed countries. This result also 
implies the need for independent directors in an emerging market like Bangladesh. We also document 
that board size is positively related to firm performance. This is consistent with the resource 
dependence argument indicating that larger boards may provide valuable business knowledge, 
expertise, skill and social and professional network to the firms (Dalton et al., 1998 and Jackling and 
Johl, 2009). Overall, larger boards in Bangladeshi companies may provide substantial business 
resources to the firms which in turn improve firm performance. 
In regards to CEO duality we document insignificant results. One possible reason for this finding 
is the combination of different industries in the analysis. For example, it may be that positive impacts 
in some industries offset negative effect in others. Indeed, some previous work (see for example, Boyd, 
1995; Brickley et al., 1997) has argued that the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance is 
dependent on both the industry and the study’s context. Our results also suggest a positive relationship 
between female directors and performance. In spite of cultural impediments female directors in 
Bangladesh play an effective monitoring role to prove their competencies which lead to better firm 
performance. Finally, we document that foreign directors have a positive impact on performance 
implying that in developing market like Bangladesh foreign board members signal a higher 
commitment to corporate monitoring and transparency which leads to an increase in firm performance.  
Our findings can help the regulators to adopt an appropriate balance of legislation, regulatory 
reform and their enforcement to make improvements in the corporate governance practices. Therefore, 
it should be of interest to regulators and policy makers in countries whose corporate ownership and 
regulatory structures are similar. While our results are probably dependent on Bangladesh’s 
institutional environment, learning the extent to which the results do generalise will help us better 
understand how institutional features matter for internal governance mechanism, especially corporate 
board structure and firm performance. Thus, further studies in different jurisdictions on the issues we 
raise in this study are warranted.  
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